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This paper examines United States Steel’s acquisition by long-term lease of the iron ore
properties of the Great Northern Railway. This 1906 transaction, which significantly increased U.S.
Steel’s already substantial ore holdings, has been characterized by contemporary observers and
modem economists as an example of vertical foreclosure. We present quantitative and qualitative
evidence to support an alternative view that the lease generated a net efficiency gain, resulting in
lower steel prices, as it promoted relationship-specific investment in the exploitation of the ore
properties. Quantitatively, we examine the stock market reactions of U.S. Steel, the Great Northern
Railway, steel industry rivals, and the railroads, a major steel customer, to the announcement of the
lease signing. Strikingly, the railroads had a significant positive excess return. Qualitatively, we
examine the terms of the lease and the performance of the parties to document the role of the lease
in encouraging relationship-specific investment.
Joseph C. Mullin
Sidley and Austin
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and NBER1 Introduction
Ronald Cease has criticized those industrid economists who frequently overlook the efficiency
attributes of innovative business practices because their professional training has predisposed them
to identifying antitrust concerns. 1 In the context of vertical relationships within and among firms,
such economists tend to view novel contractual governance structures as sophisticated devices
designed to stifle competition rather than efficient mechanisms adopted to overcome bargaining
failures and to reduce transaction costs. Other economists have followed in the tradition of Cease
by questioning the advisability of enforcement actions taken to discourage vertical integration,
whether by merger or by contract, on the grounds that the advocates of antitrust enforcement
frequently overestimate the risk of anticompetitive effect while underestimating the potential for
efficiency gains. Until recently, this view has enjoyed substantial success as antitrust authorities
have concentrated their enforcement resources in other arew. Over the past few years, however,
both government officials and economists have reconsidered the issue of vertical integration and
its potential for dampening competition through market foreclosure. This theoretical and policy
reassessment invites an empirical inquiry to determine whether these anticompetitive consequences
exist and are widespread.
This paper examines the vertical foreclosure debate in the context of the particular empirical
setting afforded by the United States Steel Corporation’s acquisition of iron ore properties during
the first decade of the twentieth century. In particular, the paper focuses on the most significmt
ore acquisition of this period, US Steel’s procurement by long-term lease of the rights to mine an
enormous tract of land on the Western Mesabi Range controlled by the Great Northern Railway
(the “Great Northern Properties”) and packaged for lease by industrialist James J. Hill’ (the “HillOre Lease” ). This paper employs quantitative and qualitative evidence to argue that the Hill Ore
Lease was responsible for a net increase in efficiency. Quantitatively, we apply the Eckbo-Stillrnan
event-study methodology to distinguish between two possible effects of the ore acquisition: (1)
vertical foreclosure of US Steel’s current and potential rivals in the final market for steel (the “fore-
closure hypothesis” ) and (2) efficiency gains (the “efficiency hypothesis”), possibly generated by
contractual governance mechanisms designed to promote relationship-specific investment in exploit-
ing synergistic economies. Eckbo and Stillman tested and rejected the market-power hypothesis in
the case of horizontal mergers by examining the stock market reactions of product market rivals
to a set of merger and antitrust announcements under the assumption of stock market efficiency.
Mullin, Mullin, and Mullin (1995) applied and extended this methodology to examine the reaction
of downst ream customers.
the stock market reaction
The present paper applies the Eckbo-Stillman methodology by analyzing
of customers and steel rivals of US Steel to the public announcement of
the signing of the Hill Ore Lease. The reaction of US Steel’s customers provides an estimate of the
net effect of the vertical transaction on product market (steel) prices.
The results of the event study suggest that the Hill Ore Lease had the net effect of lowering
the market price for steel. We then analyze the terms of the lease to uncover additiond qualita-
tive evidence of the efficiency enhancing features of US Steel’s acquisition of the Great Northern
Properties, and to identify the source of the efficiencies created by the ore acquisition. Moreover,
this historical evidence provides support for the efficiency rationale, independent of the event study
results.
There are several reasons why
uating the foreclosure hypothesis.
the Hill Ore Lease presents an appropriate opportunity for eval-
First, the foreclosure hypothesis possesses a surface plausibility
since contemporary industry observers,3 government officials,4 and modern economists, such as
2Parsons and Ray (1975)5 have dl emphasized the importance of US Steel’s control of iron ore6
in their analyses of the company’s market power in steel .7 The acquisition of the Great Northern
Properties was of primary significance both because the estimated tonnage of raw ore made the Hill
Ore Lease US Steel’s most substantial ore acquisition since its formation and because the Great
Northern Properties were the last large bloc of the critically important Mesabi Range not already in
the hands of mining interests .8 Although the Hill Ore Lewe was not a complete vertical integration
of the Great Northern Properties, it was the effective equivalent since the lease was of indefinite
durationg and the parties expected the iron ore to be substantially exhausted upon reversion.
In addition to the historical significance of the Hill Ore Lease and its role in US Steel’s perceived
vertical foreclosure of rivals, analysis of the Hill Ore Lease may offer persuasive evidence in the
contemporary antitrust debate. According to Robert Bork, defenders of the vertical foreclosure
hypothesis begin their industry analyses with the artificial premise that both upstream and down-
stream firms enjoy market power, It is therefore unsurprising that such analyses “establish some
possibility of competitive harm from the joining of two vertically related monopolies.” US Steel
appears to possess this characteristic feature of significant market shares in both the upstream and
downstream markets. Thus, the Hill Ore Lease is a natural experiment for testing the foreclosure
hypothesis. If US Steel’s acquisition of the final large available source of domestic iron ore failed
to produce vertical foreclosure, it becomes difficult to argue that vertical mergers involving much
less substantial market shares pose such a danger,
The final benefit of examining US Steel’s acquisition of the Great Northern Properties is that the
Hill Ore Lease can be analyzed as a case study in the choice of contractual governance structures.
The negotiations over the lease involved two sophisticated parties 10 bargaining over extraordinary
potential gains in the face of potentially debilitating transaction costs. Consequently, the terms of
3the contract were carefully considered by both parties over the course of several yearsll and reflected
US Steel’s accumulated experience in negotiating leases for other ore properties. In addition,
unlike most contracts between private parties, significant terms of the Hill Ore Lease were publicly
disclosedlz and contemporaneously analyzed due to the size of the transaction and its overall
13 Strikingly, contemporary critics cited significance in setting the terms of future ore acquisitions.
particular contractual terms of the acquisition as evidence of the lease’s likely anticompetitive
motivation and effect.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the historical and economic
foundations of the analysis. Section 4 presents the stock market evidence. Section 5 offers additiond
qualitative evidence from the lease and the performance of the parties which supports the hypothesis
that efficient contractual governance mechanisms explain the efficiencies generated by the Hill Ore
Lease. We also find evidence against the foreclosure hypothesis from examining similar contractual
arrangements in which foreclosure is implausible and by evaluating the terms of the Hill Ore Lease
from a foreclosure perspective. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Historical Background
From its inception in 1901, US Steel was vertically integrated, with estimated iron ore holdings in
1901 of 700 million tons, forty-four times its 1902 production rate. 14 The estimated ore holdings
of the Great Northern Railway (“Great Northern”) on the Mesabi Range15 were second ody to
those held by US Steel through its subsidiary, 16 Oliver Iron Mining Company (“US Steel”) .17 The
significance of the Mesabi Range was due not only to the rich iron content of much of its ore, but
also because the ore was perhaps ideally suited for low-cost extraction. Located near the surfacewhere it could be mined cheaply and efficiently by the strip method, the bulk of the ore was also
soft and could easily be loaded directly from the pit into railroad cars for further shipment. Such
attractive features of the Mesabi ore were enhanced by recent technological innovations which made
the stripping method less physically cumbersome and more energy efficient.ls
In the years preceding the Hill Ore Lease, both US Steel and the Great Northern began preparing
their individual Mesabi properties for the large scale mining, handling, and transportation of ore.lg
Such preparations were necessary because full exploitation of the rich Mesabi ore lands had been
hampered by the scarcity of transportation facilities on some lines, particularly those of the Great
Northern.zo Dock facilities also were in need of an upgrade to handle greater capacity, a factor
which required a long lead-time .21
During the years 1901-1906, US Steel embarked on a series of acquisitions of iron properties
which included lands on the Mesabi Range. These earlier additions, however, were “completely
overshadowed “ 22 in October 1906 when US Steel and the Great Northern finally announced agree-
ment on the terms to the Hill Ore Lease after years of sporadic negotiations. According to the terms
of the lease, US Steel agreed to pay a base royalty rate of 85 cents per ton of ore with an automatic
increase of 3.4 cents each year for the duration of the lease. 23 The royalty was adjustable on a
sliding scale to reflect the quality of ore, aa measured by the iron content.24 The royalty, however,
was only a portion of the consideration. Ore mined on the Great Northern Properties waa to be
transported exclusively on the Great Northern Railway at the profitable freight rate of 80 cents per
ton.25
The lease included a “take or pay” provision 26 in which US Steel committed itself to mine
substantial guaranteed minimum tonnages of ore. The guaranteed minimums began at 750,000 tons
of ore in 1907 and escalated by an annual increment of 750,000 tons until the guaranteed minimum
5for 1917 was scheduled to reach 8,250,000 tons. 27 In subsequent years, the guaranteed minimum
would remain at 8,250,000 tons. Because the vast majority of the Great Northern Properties
was undeveloped in 1906, 28 the parties anticipated that US Steel would fail to meet its minimum
mining obligation in the first few years of the lease and therefore US Steel was permitted to make
up the difference in later years. 29 An indication of the magnitude of these requirements is that the
1917 guaranteed minimum of 8,250,000 tons was forty-four percent of US Steel’s Lake Superior ore
production in 1905, and twenty-four percent of total Lake Superior ore production in 1905.30
A final lease term is that US Steel received the option to terminate the lease on January 1, 1915
upon giving two years notice.31
From 1907 until 1911, US Steel and the Great Northern both fully performed on their contractual
obligations under the lease. Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section 5, each party had made
substantial investments in mining and transportation operations on the Great Northern Properties.
In 1911, however, political events in the form of intense antitrust scrutiny intervened to disrupt
their contractual relationship.
The formation of US Steel and its subsequent ore acquisitions attracted the unwelcome attention
of the Bureau of Corporations (the “Bureau”) which conducted an exhaustive study of US Steel’s
position in the Steel Industry. The Bureau submitted its initial report in July 1911, concluding that
US Steel exerted a “monopolistic influence”32 on the steel industry. That influence reportedly rested
chiefly on its iron ore holdings in general, and the Hill Ore Lease in particular. The same public
concerns which had motivated the Bureau’s investigation into the concentration of the iron and
steel industry also drew the attention of the House of Representatives which established a special
committee in May 1911 chaired by Augustus Stanley (the “Stanley Hearings”) to investigate the
business practices of US Steel for possible violations of the antitrust laws.
6In the shadow of the Stanley Hearings and facing an imminent dissolution suit by the Depart-
ment of Justice, US Steel announced in October 1911 that it would exercise its option to terminate
the Hill Ore Lease at the earliest possible date, January 1, 1915. The announcement came two
years before US Steel was contractually bound to provide such notice.33 Most commentators have
concluded that US Steel’s cancellation oft he lease was motivated by fear of antitrust enforcement ,M
reasoning that cancellation was the single act, “more than any other the corporation could [take,
to] forestall a possible action under the Sherman law.” 35
In spite of US Steel’s eleventh hour attempts to avert an antitrust enforcement action, the




and steel industries. US Steel responded aggressively to the suit, and after years of
district court ruled in favor of US Steel,36 a decision later firmed by the Supreme
3 Economic Background
Economic analysis of vertical foreclosure has developed over time in response to increasingly sophis-
ticated understandings of industrial organization and strategies available to market participants.
The following discussion briefly surveys the evolution of the patterns and theories of market fore-
closure. For the purposes of this paper, the critical observation is that the fundamental effect of
any of these hypothesized patterns of successful foreclosure is a restriction of output in both the
upstream (iron ore) and downstream (steel) markets with a corresponding increase in price coming
at the expense of customers in the downstream product market.
One theory of market foreclosure is that incumbent monopolists will use vertical integration asa “barrier to entry” which compels potential rivals to enter at both levels of production. In this
context, the acquisition by US Steel of a size able share of an essential input restricted entry. As
the trade publication Iron Age remarked,
With the Great Northern ores in other hands the Steel Corporation’s position might one day
be disputed; if they were held without development they might become the basis of strong new
competition.3s
Closely related to entry barrier analysis is the strategy of “raising rivals’ costs,” outlined by
Krattenmaker and Salop (1986). Under this strategy, after acquiring the Great Northern properties,
US Steel would restrict iron ore output by refusing to supply ore to other steel producers. Moreover,
the remaining independent ore producers would then be able to raise their prices as well. The
resulting increase in iron ore prices, and hence in the marginal cost of US Steel’s actual or potential
steel rivals, would lead to reduced steel output and higher steel prices. This theory assumes that
the integrated firm will forego profit opportunities to sell inputs to its downstream rivals.3g
Finally, in recent work Salinger (1988), Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990), and Hart and Tirole
(1990) have developed models of imperfect competition in which vertical integration can have
anticompetitive effects on downstream competition. The most recent and general of these models
is Hart and Tirole (1990). Bolton and Whinston (1991, 1993) study a complementary set of issues
involving not downstream competition but supply assurance concerns .40
In the Hart and Tirole setup, there are two upstream firms, U1 and UZ, and two downstream
firms, DI and Dz. The two downstream firms act as Cournot competitors in the final goods market,
while the two upstream firms produce a necessary intermediate good at constant marginal costs c1
and C2. Each upstream firm Ui may vertically integrate with the corresponding downstream firm
Di. After the integration decision, both upstream firms offer simultaneous, secret supply contracts
to each downstream unit .41They present three varimts of their basic model. The most relevant in our context is variant
one, ex post monopolization, with iron ore upstream and steel production downstream. Suppose
that U1 is more efficient than U2, i.e. c1 < C2. Under non-integration, U1 will produce more than
the monopoly output of the intermediate good, because of its incentive to sell to both downstream
firms 42 Under vertical integration, the merged entity U1 – D1 will be able to implement profit
sharing, 43 and so U1 will no longer have the incentive to supply Dz with more than the quantity of
the intermediate good that is optimal for the vertical structure. 44 Vertical integration is motivated
by and has the effect of restricting output in the intermediate goods market. This in turn directly
restricts output in the final goods market .45
This is an appropriate model in which to consider the vertical relationship between US Steel
and the Great Northern Ore properties. First, it begins with an imperfectly competitive market
structure both upstream and downstream. Second, the model not only predicts vertical integration
and foreclosure, but predicts that it will be the lower cost upstream firm that will be involved in
this integration. Since the Great Northern Ore properties were suit ed for low-cost extraction, it
would be represented by U1, and US Steel by D1. This identification might seem at odds with one
feature of the transaction, namely that US Steel acquired the Great Northern Ore properties, not
the other way around. But in the Hart and Tirole model it does not matter whether the upstream
or downstream firm makes the acquisition, M long m the acquisition takes place .46
Great Northern acquisition did effect the requisite type of profit sharing, since after US
the ore it was free to process it internally or sell it to other steel manufacturers.
Finally, the
Steel mined
Transaction cost economists provide an alternative, procompetitive explanation for complex
vertical relationships which otherwise might be analyzed as mechanisms for vertical foreclosure.
In contrast to the proponents of the market foreclosure hypothesis, transaction cost economists
9“mzintain[] the rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting, of which vertical
integration is an extreme form, have the purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs .“47
Paul Joskow has succinctly summarized the contractual governance literature as follows:
When specific investments represent a significant fraction of the costs of consummat-
ing an efficient vertical supply arrangement, the reliance on simple anonymous spot
market transactions is likely to be an unsatisfactory governance mechanism for induc-
ing the parties to make the specific investments necessary to yield a least-cost supply
relationship .4s
The source of the failure of the spot market is that relationship-specific investment transforms an
ex ante competitive market into an ex post bilateral monopoly with the potential for opportunism
by one or both of the parties. Unless this potential is ameliorated, the parties will under-invest
in the relationship. A logical alternative to relying on the ex-post spot market would be to write
a long-term contract ex-ante, specifying explicitly the investment levels and other actions to be
taken by all parties to the exchange in all states of the world. It will not be feasible to write such
a complete, contingent contract, however. As Cease (1937) and Williamson (1975) emphasize, the
transaction costs involved in attempting to write and enforce such a contract are so severe that
contracts are necessarily incomplete, “containing gaps and missing provisions. In particular [the
contract] will be silent about the parties’ obligations in some states of the world and will specify
these obligations only coarsely or ambiguously in other states of the world.”49
In light of the hazards of the spot market and contractual incompleteness, transaction costs
economists predict the parties will adopt appropriate contractual governance structures to prevent
ex post opportunism and thus promote an efficient level of investment. Thus, transaction costs
10economists would encourage antitrust officials to be attentive to the efficiency enhancing features
of contracts which may initially appear to pose antitrust concerns.
Just as US Steel’s high market share in steel and ore production makes vertical foreclosure
a plausible explanation for the Hill Ore lease, the importance of relationship-specific investments
in this environment makes efficient contractual governance a plausible alternative explanation. Of
Oliver Williamson’s (1983) four categories of relationship-specific investments susceptible to ex post
opportunism, the two most prominently featured in the acquisition of the Great Northern Properties
were physical asset specificity-investments in durable assets which involve design characteristics
specific to the transaction; and site specificity-investments in relatively immobile assets located to
minimize transportation costs. Moreover, the Ore lease included provisions to address the issue of
contractual incompleteness, for example giving US Steel the unilateral option to cancel the lease.
We will develop this analysis more fully in section five.
Hart and Tirole (1990) analyze a more involved model of ex post monopolization that incorpo-
rates investments by both upstream and downstream firms. These investments are industry-specific
rather than relationship-specific, however. The issue of relationship-specific investments is featured
more prominently in Bolton and Whinston (1991,1993). Their work is complementary to Hart and
Tirole since they choose to assume away any downstream competitive effects of vertical integra-
tion in order to isolate the effect of ownership structure on investment incentives. In their (1993)
article, there is a single upstream firm, U, and two downstream firms, D1 and D2, which are not
product market competitors. Each downstream firm has a customer with (at most) unit demand
for the final good. The customer’s valuation for Di’s product is v;(l; ,s) for i = 1,2, where Ii is the
non-contractible investment undertaken by Di, and s is the random state of nature. Investment Ii
generates a private, non-contractible cost Ci(Ii) to Di .50 The find customer’s realized valuation vi
11can be fully extracted by the downstream firm if it makes a sale.
Production of the final good by Di requires one unit of the input produced by U, but no other
inputs. Supply assurance problems are modelled starkly: with probability A, U can only produce
one unit. Otherwise, U can produce two units, one for each downstream firm. After investments
are sunk and uncertainty is resolved, the sale of the input is determined by a bargaining game
patterned on Rubinstein (1982). Under integration, however, the owner can transfer the input
between divisions unilatera~y.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), contracts are assumed to be incomplete. In fact, only
spot contracting is assumed to be feasible. The integration or ownership decision, and with it the
allocation of residual rights of control, affects private and social welfare through changing ex-post
bargaining payoffs and therefore ex-ante investment incentives. As Bolton and Whinston (1991)
explain, “Ownership thus provides both a protection against the misappropriation of returns and a
stronger future negotiating position whenever future trade and production decisions involving the
use of the asset have to be made. When the ownership of an asset changes hands, the new acquirer
sees his future returns better protected, in particular his marginal contribution to his future returns
is better protected. ”51
One result is that non-integration leads both downstream firms to under-invest relative to the
social optimum. The reason for this under-investment is that through the bargaining process there
is ex-post expropriation of part of the return from investing. This parallels Grossman and Hart’s
result in a bilateral setting. 52
investment of the downstream
downstream independent firm.
Bolton and Whinston find that vertical integration increases the
integrated firm and decreases the investment and the payoff of the
These effects provide the private motivation for vertical integration.
The shift in investment patterns that accompanies vertical integration also gives rise to an increase
12in self-supply, i.e., the upstream firm is more likely to supply its downstream division than when
that downstream unit was independent .53
But not all the results from a bilateral setting carry over exactly to this multilateral setting.
Strikingly, Bolton and Whinston find that vertical integration leads the integrated firm to over-
invest relative to the social optimum. This over-investment occurs because in some states of the
world, the integrated firm earns a positive marginal return on its investment even though the social
return is zero. To illustrate, suppose that U1 and D1 are integrated. Consider the state of the
world in which there is only one unit of the input, and V2 > VI. Ex-post bargaining will result in
D2 receiving the input at a price of WI. As a result, the integrated firm receives a private return
to its investment in increasing VI in this
benefit to this investment (since D1 does
Bolton and Whinston are not able to
state of the world, even though there is no gross social
not receive the input ).
make global comparisons about the social desirability of
the ownership structures, but they find situations in which there are private incentives for vertical
integration to arise although non-integration would be socially preferable. On the other hand, they
do find other situations in which vertical integration is socially preferable to non-integration. In
particular, if the probability of an upstream shortage is zero (A = O), then vertical integration is
optimal. Both the efficiency and foreclosure effects operate in their model through the effect on
investment incentives.
The Bolton and Whinston results suggest that one should not immediately identify transaction
cost concerns in vertical integration with efficiency-enhancement. Nevertheless, there are several
reasons why such an identification seems warranted in the acquisition of the Great Northern Ore
properties (Upstream) by US Steel (Downstream).
First, their model predicts that vertical integration is efficient if there is no probability of
13an exogenous upstream shortage. Since the Great Northern Ore properties were so vast, any
shortage was years if not decades in the future. 54 The Hill lease could lead to restriction of iron
ore production, of course, but that type of endogenous “shortage” is more consistent with the Hart
and Tirole model than the Bolton and Whinston assumption.
Second, the conditions required for an overinvestment effect appear to be extremely limited
or absent. In particular, if we identify US Steel as D1, what can we say about D2? Ln the
cent emporary trade press, no other steel manufacturer was identified aa a possible developer of
the Great Northern Ore properties. Rather, it was thought that J.J. Hill himself or some other
entrepreneur might enter the steel industry, using the Great Northern properties as a source of
inputs. Moreover, because of US Steel’s pre-lease holdings on the Mesabi, there were particular
synergies generated by consolidating and exploiting those properties jointly. These are all reasons
why the costs of supplying the ore to US Steel would likely be lower than supplying the ore to any
other steel manufacturer. In the parlance of the model, it is likely that V1 > V2 for most states
of the world. As a result, the overinvestment effect would be unlikely to arise, since it operates
through those situations in which V1 < W2and so the independent downstream firm, D2, receives
the input. Absent this overinvestment effect, vertical integration is both privately and socially
optimal. Intuitively, if D2 is a sufficiently inferior competitor to D1 in the input market, then the
Bolton and Whinston model mimics the bilateral setting explored in Grossman and Hart.
Finally, Bolton and Whinston assume that vertical integration has no effect on the prices charged
to final consumers. A chief concern of cent emporary observers was that the lease would affect the
competitiveness of the steel market. It seems much more plausible that any foreclosure effect of
the Hill Ore lease would be captured in the ex post monopolization result of Hart and Tirole, and
therefore would be reflected in higher prices for steel.
14For these reasons, and for the sake of economy of language, we will refer to the efficiency and
transaction cost hypotheses interchangeably, and distinguish those hypotheses from the “vertical
foreclosure” hypothesis. Bolton and Whinston’s theoretical results should still serve as a caveat to
such an identification in other settings, however.
Empirical evidence of vertical foreclosure has been limited. Allen (1971) finds that vertical
integration of cement and ready-mix concrete firms was justified by executives by reference to fore-
closure concerns .55 Grimm, Winston, and Evans (1992) analyze railroad route structures that are
56 Chipt y (1995) studies verti- isomorphic to vertical integration, and find some foreclosure effects.
cal integration between program channels and cable system operators .57 She finds that foreclosure
occurs; integrated cable operators exclude rival channels. But she also finds that consumers never-
theless benefit from integration. Snyder (1995a) and (1995b) utilized the event study methodology
to assess vertical foreclosure in the beer and petroleum industries.5s He finds some evidence of
foreclosure effects. His studies are distinguished from the present one in that he did not examine
the stock market reactions of any firms that were final product customers.
4 Stock Market Evidence
The principal quantitative approach of this paper is an application of the Eckbo-Stillman event
study methodology that has been used to analyze the competitive effect of mergers. We examine
the abnormal stock market returns of firms theoretically affected by US Steel’s acquisition of the
Great Northern Properties. The stock market reactions of these firms to the acquisition shed light
on the competing hypotheses.
Under the foreclosure hypothesis, a steel market competitor could either be hurt by its exclusion
15from a source of supply, particularly if the company lacked substantial ore holdings, or helped by the
exclusion of pot entid competitors. 59 Under the efficiency hypothesis, however, vertical integration
would lower US Steel’s production costs thus making it a more effective competitor. Steel rivals
would therefore be hurt, unless they could replicate the results of US Steel’s contractual innovation.
This latter possibility appears unlikely since there were particular synergies between US Steel’s pre-
1906 Mesabi holdings and the Great Northern Properties.
Examining only the response of rivals is not very informative, because both hypotheses would
explain a negative excess return. This shortcoming may be addressed by examining the abnormal
stock market returns of steel customers. The foreclosure hypothesis implies an increase in customer
costs and thus a negative return. In contrast, the efficiency hypothesis predicts more vigorous
competition and thus a price benefit which would partially be transmitted to the customers. As
outlined, the “foreclosure” and “efficiency” hypotheses are not mutudy exclusive, a possibility frdly
acknowledged by the recent foreclosure literature. 60 But the stock market reactions of customers
will represent the net effect of the acquisition on steel market prices. Thus a positive response by
steel customers will be sufficient but not necessary to establish that the transaction was welfare-
enhancing.
These stock market reactions can be estimated in an event study. This paper computes the
expect ed or “normal” return to a security i at time t according to the CAPM, and so the resulting
regression equation is:
Rit – Rft = ai + ~;(&t – Rjt) + ~fi,~st + ~it
fort =1, . . .T, in which
(1)
16Rit = return from holding one share of firm i’s stock for week t
Rft = risk free rate at time t
Rmt = return on the market portfolio in week t
D.t = a dummy variable with a value of one if an event occurs in week s, and zero otherwise
~it = a serially uncorrelated random disturbance
4.1 Sample and Data
This paper uses weekly data from December 2, 1905 to November 3, 1906, 49 weeks yielding 48
weekly returns .61
The reactions of four sets of firms are analyzed: US Steel, the Great Northern Preferred, a
portfolio of independent steel producers representing US Steel’s rivals (“Rivals”), and a portfolio
of 39 railroads, excluding the Great Northern, representing US Steel’s customers (“Railroads”) .62
The railroads were by far the largest consumers of iron and steel during this period,a and
steel was a substantial input cost for the railroads, constituting approximately 10 percent of their
operating costs. 64 Ideally, responses of other customer groups would be included to compare their
response to that of the railroads, but such groups could not be used due to data limitations. The
most significant shortcoming from using the railroads as a steel customer group is the complex inter-
relationship between steel companies and railroads. In particular, steel companies were important
customers of the railroads, with railroad charges representing a large portion of the cost of steel.65
Yet as we argued in a related context, these other relationships should not bias inferences derived
from this event study. 66 In particular, the Great Northern Ore acquisition could indirectly tiect
railroad profitability either by affecting the quantity of steel transported by the railroads, or by
affecting the quantity of ore transported by the railroads. The former effect, which we have dubbed
17the “railroad- (as) -supplier” effect, “simply constitutes another transmission mechanism through
which the quantity of steel production positively tiects railroad profits. ” As a result, it still allows
one to infer the net effect of the Ore acquisition on steel industry output, and hence prices. The
latter effect, involving the transportation of ore, is unimportant in the present context since the
Hill Ore Lease provided for exclusive transportation by the Great Northern, the returns for which
have been excluded from the railroad portfolio.
A further complication is that since steel was a durable input for the railroads, an increase in
the price of steel would raise not only the cost of future railroad expenditures on steel, but also the
value of the railroads’ existing capital stock. As long as this capital effect is not too strong, however,
this would lower the magnitude but not change the sign of the railroads’ stock market response.
There are several reasons to believe that the effect on future expenditures would be the main effect.
First, the railroads could reap benefits from the enhanced value of their capital only if they could
sell off the steel. But recovering steel rails, for example, would involve considerable direct expense
and leave the railroads with the choice of replacing the recovered steel rails with an inferior non-
steel rail, or abandoning the track.67 Second, at this time the rtilroads were continuing to make
substantial expenditures on steel for track and equipment. This was both to replace depreciated
items and to expand their capital stock. The railroads were not to become a declining industry for a
decade or more in the future, 68 Total railroad mileage was expanding through double-tracking and
yard-trackage, and wood freight cars were being replaced by steel cars.69 Finally, results from our
previous study (Mullin, Mullin, and Mullin (1995)) on the US Steel dissolution suit are consistent
with our claim that the railroads can serve as an appropriate customer group. In that study we
found that the railroads experienced positive (negative) excess returns to a series of events from
the dissolution suit that increased (decreased) the probability that US Steel would be dissolved. Of
18course, it is possible that railroads are not an appropriate customer group, and so our inferences
in that previous study were incorrect. But it nevertheless constitutes a consistent pattern from a
related but not identical setting.
For the market portfolio, we formed an equally weighted portfolio of the 50 stocks composing the
New York Times index, with returns corrected for dividends and stock splits .70 Half of the stocks
in this index were railroads, reflecting the railroads’ prominence in the stock market during this
period. As a result, unmodified use of this market return wotid create the problem of endogeneity.
As a result, in the estimation we employ instrument d variables. One instrument is the return on
an equally weighted portfolio of the nine stocks which were judged to be nonsensitive to changes
in the steel industry. 71 A second instrument is the deseasonalized percentage change in the volume
of bank clearings, since bank clearings, seasonally adjusted, were an important macroeconomic
indicator .72
For the risk free rate of return, we employ the imputed weekly rate on 60 day time loans, as
reported by the Financial Review.73
4.2 Event Selection
A common problem of event studies is that an event candidate may have been anticipated by the
stock market. The Eckbo- Stillman methodology solves this problem by conditioning on the reaction
of the parties directly involved in the transaction. If one or both of those parties have a significant
response, then that indicates that the event brought news to the stock market.
The hypothesized event is LEAS ESIGN, the formal announcement of the signing of the Hill
Ore Lease, which occurred during the week ended October 6, 1906. We examined several reports
on the steel industry during this period from the weekly trade publication, The Iron Age magazine,
19and daily editions of the New York Times and The WaH Street Journal to determine the event
window. The Hill Ore Lease was subject to extended negotiations and many of the general terms of
74 Contemporary news the contract were publicly known prior to the announcement of the signing.
accounts suggest, however, that the formal announcement did release news to the stock market.
A second obvious event candidate, which we do not explore further, is US Steel’s 1911 an-
nouncement of its cancellation of the Hill Ore Lease. In a prior study, cancellation of the lease
generated an 18 percent negative excess return for the beneficiaries of the lease, the Great Northern
Ore Certificate Holders.75 The source of the loss is indeterminate, however, because the excess neg-
ative return could signify either the forfeiture of a share of future monopoly rents pursuant to the
foreclosure hypothesis, or a capital loss incurred on sunk relationship-specific investments under
the efficiency hypothesis. Moreover, the source of the stock market reactions of US Steel, steel
rivals, and the railroads is also indeterminate because of the circumstances under which US Steel
surrendered control of the Great Northern Properties. The lease cancellation had multiple, possibly
conflicting market power effects: (1) it brought about a short-term reconcentration of the iron ore
market; (2) it may have released information to the stock market about the probability that US
Steel would face a dissolution suit and (3) it may have reduced the probability of that dissolution
suit and thus increased the probability of long-term concentration in iron and steel markets.
A final comment on our choice of weekly stock return data and a weekly event window. Our
initial reason for employing weekly rather than daily data was due to the high time-cost in hand
collecting this historical stock market data. Moreover, we believe that although the use of daily
return data would likely result in more efficient estimation, that any increase in efficiency would
not be substantial.
Since there were six trading days each week during this time period, one might assume that
20daily data would simply multiply the sample size by six, and so the relative efficiency of using daily
rather than weekly data would be 2.45. This must be considered an upper bound, however, since
it ignores the serial dependence of the daily observations. Moreover, there is a cost associated with
using high frequency data and a narrow event window. As Ellison and Mullin (1995) note, “When
the precise timing of an event is uncertain, there is a trade-off in the choice of event window. Two
issues arise. The shorter the window, the more precise will be the estimates of the event response.
However, the shorter the window, the more likely that the news, and hence the stock market’s
response, will fall out side the event window.”76 Contemporary accounts suggest that news about
the Hill Ore lease w= released on several days in the week of LEAS ESIGN, leading up to the day
of the formal announcement of the lease. 77 Of course, with daily data one could estimate a daily
market model and compute and cumulate abnormal returns for several days surrounding the event
day. But the simulation results by Dyckman, Philbrick, and Stephan (1984) indicate that when
there is event-date uncertainty, cumulating residuals from a daily market model “gives results that
78 Intuitively, if one are essentially equivalent” to using a longer estimation period, such as a week.
can observe abnormal performance only at a weekly
higher frequency data is considerably attenuated.
frequency, then the efficiency gain from using
4.3 Results
Table 1 at the end of the paper presents the stock market reactions to LEAS ESIGN, Focus initially
on the excess returns of U.S. Steel and the Great Northern Railway. The economically meaningful
and statistically significant positive 4.1 percent excess return by U, S. Steel indicates that news was
released to the stock market.
21Although the economically meaningful (but not statistically significant) negative excess return
for the Great Northern Preferred is initially troubling, closer examination reveals several satisfactory
explanations for the result. First, note that the ret urn analyzed is for Great Northern Preferred
stock. The private holders of Great Northern common stock
Great Northern Preferred would be the principal beneficiaries
rather than the public holders of
of excess profits. The division of
profits from the Hill Ore Lease in favor of the common stockholders is particularly pronounced
because it was generally understood at the time of the announcement that the Great Northern
Properties would be spun off and distributed to the common stockholders.7g Nevertheless, the Great
Northern Preferred enjoyed a robust positive 1.4 percent daily return on the day the lease agreement
was announced, a return which contemporary market observers attributed to the agreement .m
Presumably the primary source of this positive return was the benefit the Great Northern would
continue to derive from the royalties paid on the freight of ore shipped from the Great Northern
Properties. Finally, it appears that the announced terms were slightly more favorable to US Steel
than had been expected. 81 These circumstances cumulatively provide persuasive evidence that
news was communicated to the market when the lease agreement was announced because although
the terms were less favorable to the Great Northern than expected, such negative information was
overwhelmed on the day of the announcement by the positive news that a find agreement had been
reached.
Having established that news was conveyed to the market by the LEASESIGN event, it is now
appropriate to examine the abnormal returns of the railroads and the steel rivals. The right hand
side of Table 1 shows the average responses of the railroads and the steel rivals.
The most suggestive result of the event study is the economically meaningful positive excess
ret urn of nearly 1 percent experienced by the railroads. This is consistent with the efficiency
22hypothesis. We cannot flatly rule out the foreclosure hypothesis, although the results suggest that
any foreclosure effects on steel prices were anticipated to be more more than offset by the efficiency
gains passed onto steel customers. In interpreting the magnitude of this effect, recall that steel
purchases represented only ten percent of the railroads’ total operating costs. Thus a modest
excess return on railroad equity implies a far greater expected effect on steel prices.
This excess return of the railroads is statistically significant at the 5 % level against the one-sided
alternative, and significant at the 10 70 level against the two-sided alternative of zero effect. The
one-sided alternative may be more appropriate in this context; the striking feature of these results
may be the failure to find a significant negative response by the railroads. There are some sources of
concern about this precision, in particular our use of the standard normal distribution to assess the
significance of the t-statistics. Since our estimation involves two-stage least squares in a relatively
small sample, we cannot readily invoke the asymptotic properties of this estimator. Moreover, stock
market returns are known to be distributed non-normally, with fat tails, suggesting that the true
significance level for our results is higher than 5 YOor 10 YO. This non-normality is replicated in our
sample; we can reject the normality of the railroads’ realized returns based on the Shapiro- Wilk
W-test ‘2 However, we cannot reject the normality of the residuals from our CAPM regression
model; we cannot reject the hypothesis that excess railroad returns are distributed normally, based
on the Shapiro- Wilk W-test. 83 Since our inferences are based on the distribution of excess returns,
we are confident in labelLing the railroads’ results as startistically significant.
The negative excess return suffered by the steel Rivals is also consistent with the efficiency
hypothesis, but the result is neither statisticdly significant nor can it be used to distinguish between
the efficiency and foreclosure hypotheses, The foreclosure hypothesis also predicts a negative return
for the rivals if relatively unintegrated steel rivals are foreclosed from a source of supply.
235 Efficient Contractual Governance Structures
The results in Section four substantially undermine the foreclosure hypothesis as the sole expla-
nation for US Steel’s acquisition of the Great Northern Properties while supporting the efficiency
hypothesis. The evidence from the stock market data, however, is unable to identify the source of
the gain in efficiency. In this Section, we offer additional qualitative evidence supporting the effi-
ciency hypothesis by analyzing the Hill Ore Lease in search of the source of its efficiency enhancing
features. First, we analyze the synergies and cost efficiencies US Steel and the Great Northern
sought to achieve by uniting their productive capacities and committing their combined resources
to relationship-specific investment in the Great Northern Properties. Second, we compare the gov-
ernance structures of the Hill Ore Lease with those used by the parties in similar transactions in
which market foreclosure is an implausible explanation for the selection of such structures. In par-
ticular, after the Hill lease was cancelled, the Trustees for the Ore Properties signed contracts with
smaller firms with terms similar to the US Steel lease. Third, we examine the parties’ choice of
contractual governance structures and evaluate the effectiveness of such structures in producing the
desired outcomes by examining the motivation and effect of individual contractual terms. Fourth,
we examine the individual contractual terms in light of the foreclosure hypothesis.
5.1 Durable, Relationship-Specific Investments
The Hill Ore Lease presented US Steel with an attractive investment opportunity because of the
complementary relationship between the Great Northern Properties and US Steel’s preexisting
ore properties on the Western Mesabi Range. US Steel determined that by uniting the two most
substantial tracts on the Western Mesabi it could generate cost-saving economies by taking charge
24of the properties from the beginning and developing the lands according to its long-term mining
strategy wit bout being hampered by previous occupiers and outside or adverse interests ,84
As an illustration of the relationship between the ore lands of the Great Northern and those
of US Steel, consider Figure 1, which presents a map of part of the Western Mesabi near Col-
eraine Minnesota.85 The map identifies the holdings of the Oliver Mining Company, a US Steel 1
subsidiary, and the Great Northern Railway, as of February 1906. Almost all the property between
the Northern and Southern boundaries of the range were held by one of these two parties, or held
jointly. Moreover, these properties were intermingled, so that unified control could allow for the
development of a large, stripped open pit mine for a group of adjacent properties.
Exploitation of the synergies arising from unified development of the Western Mesabi Range,
however, first required the parties to agree to a governance structure which would provide both of
them with optimal performance incentives over the life of the lease. Efficient extraction of the ore
required both US Steel and the Great Northern to make relationship-specific investments, resources
the parties would not commit unless ex post opportunism could be averted with ex ante contractual
governance structures. Of Williamson’s four categories of relationship-specific investments, two
categories, physical asset specificity and site specificity, loom large in this context. There is a third
element of asset specificity in this environment, that of dedicated capacity.
The need for both physical asset and site specificity in developing the Great Northern Properties
was diet ated by exogenous circumst mces–that is, by the best available methods to extract the ore
at minimum cost. US Steel’s fundamental approach to the Mesabi ore lands was to plan its ore
developments for the indefinite rather than the immediate future,s6 and thus “to prepare for a long
continued period of cheap mining [so] that an entire ore body [could] be extracted at minimum
expense. ”87
25Due to the long lead-time in the investments made by US Steel, and to a lesser extent those
made by the Great Northern, there was an initial delaygg in the extraction of ore. By the end of 1908
US Steel had spent approximately $4 million on preparing the Great Northern Properties before
ext ratting any ore, 89 We estimate that US Steel spent at least another $4 million in developing
mines in the next several years. w If we take $8 million as our estimate of US Steel’s direct
development costs, this would amount to $84 million in 1994 dollars. 91 This $8 million investment is
overshadowed when compared to US Steel’s total capitalization of $1.4 billion. But this investment
was substantial when comparing to the existing investments in ore properties. In April 1901 US
Steel’s total book investment in improvements in all iron ore properties was about $9 million.g2
Moreover, the wide variety of asset specific preparations made on the part of US Steel drew the
attention of contemporary commentators who noted,
...[US Steel is determined] to open these mines on the most improved and scientific
principles possible, and to prepare itself for a vast product at the lowest cost per ton.
Vast sums have been spent, and this expenditure is continuing, in the preparation for the
beginning of mining operations in the Western Mesaba, enormous stripping operations
are in progress, model towns are building, investments of hundreds of thousands of
dollars are being made simply to assure the company that its employees shall be of the
character desired and shall be reasonably permanent .93
These constitute only those investments directly involved in the mining of iron ore. But US Steel
could and did make specific investments in its steel manufacturing operations to take advantage of
a large, assured supply of ore. An additional motivation for site specific assets was the significance
of transportation costs in the production of steel. Consequently, soon after the signing of the
26Hill Ore Lease, US Steel began plans for constructing a large iron and steel plant in the vicinity
of Duluth Minnesota to supplement its Gary Indiana plant and to save on transportation costs.w
Clearly, the entire value of this investment was not specific to US Steel’s relationship with the Great
Northern, since the Steel Corporation did
own, Nevertheless, it is striking that US
control a substantial portion of the Mesabi range on its
Steel did not purchase land for the Duluth plant until
1907, (shortly) after the signing of the Hill lease. Plant expenditures totfled nearly $6 million
by the cancellation of the Hill lease. 95 Construction continued, and the plant began operations in
1916 after total undiscounted expenditures of $24.1 million. 96 The completed Duluth plant had
“an annual capacity of 360,000 tons of finished steel products.”g7
Clearly, US Steel bore the greater responsibility to invest in completion of the mining operations.
The Great Northern, however, was also responsible for making nontrivial relationship-specific in-
vestments pursuant to their freight duties. 98 These latter investments involved both site specificity
and dedicated capacity as the Great Northern expanded its dock and track facilities to accommo-
date the ore shipments. 99 In particular, the Great Northern constructed track branches to the edge
of new mines, so that ore could be loaded directly into the freight cars. 100 The rolling stock was
obviously mobile, but specialized as well. The freight cars moved the ore from the mines to the
docks on Lake Superior. James J. Hill testified that the freight “cars are such cars as cannot be
used for any other purpose. They are a peculiar car. They are short, and are made to fit the old
docks . . .the hatches of the vessels were made to fit them.’’l”l The locomotives were also somewhat
specialized to ore traffic, with a Mallet engine, optimized to pull very heavy loads but at relatively
low speeds.loz
As Williamson and the other transaction cost economists have observed, transactions charac-
terized by significant relationship-specific investments will require special contractual governance
27mechanisms to prevent the danger of opportunistic behavior which is characteristic of spot market
exchanges involving prior relationship-specific investments. Analysis of the overall structure and
specific terms of the Hill Ore Lease will show that the very terms which attracted the condemna-
tion of antitrust officials as insidious instruments of market foreclosure,1°3 were actually efforts to
encourage an efficient level of relationship-specific investment by the parties.
5.2 Lease terms in comparable transactions
Before analyzing the likely effects of particular contractual terms, we should note that comparable
transactions implemented a similar contractual scheme in situations in which market foreclosure
is an implausible hypothesis. For example, US Steel used many of the same terms applicable to
the Hill Ore Lease when negotiating much smaller iron ore acquisitions. US Steel consistently
sought to extend leases which were due to expire to a new term of 50 years or longer. In return
for a modest royalty rate, US Steel would agreed to a take or pay provision guaranteeing large
annual minimums.1°4 In addition, US Steel employed similar contractual terms in its relationships
with suppliers of coal. 105 The extraordinary abundance of coal makes foreclosure an implausible
explanation for the governance structures used in US Steel’s coal acquisitions .106 The feature these
contracts do share with the Hill Ore Lease, however, is the requirement that both parties make
relationship-specific investments to create an efficient supplier-producer ~sociation.1°7
Even more significant evidence is provided by the experience of the Hill lands after the termi-
nation of the lease by US Steel. Soon after the announcement of cancellation, the Great Northern
Trustees (the “Trustees’’)lOs began making arrangements for continued mining of the ore lands,log
to a great extent benefiting from US Steel’s sunk investment in improving the facilities both on
the mines US Steel had developed and those of adjoining properties. 110 Initially, the Trustees
28sought to open these lands directly on behalf of the Trust mining the land on its own account .111
While continuing to work some mines, the Trustees later reverted to leasing a majority of the ore
properties,llz seeking reimbursement from lessees for improvements made by the lessors on the
lands.113
Advocates of the enforcement actions taken against US Steel cite the reconcentration of the
Great Northern Properties as evidence that US Steel’s ownership of such properties was a substan-
tial barrier to entry for competing iron producers and smaller, integrated steel firms ,114 The leases
such smaller firms entered into, however, contained terms similar 115 to those conttined in the Hill
Ore Lease including guaranteed minimums116 and mandatory investments.117 This suggests that
such terms were designed to safeguard genuine efficiencies created by vertical integration.
This provides fairly compelling evidence that US Steel was motivated by concerns of contractual
governance rather than market foreclosure in signing the Hill ore lease. Now to consider how this
motivation is illustrated by the terms of the lease
5.3 Specific Lease Terms
The terms of the ore lease bear striking resemblance to the terms of contracts studied in the
transaction cost literature. As a result, an examination of these individual terms recapitulates
much of the scholarship on contractual governance undertaken in the past two decades.
5.3,1 Take or Pay Requirement
Critics of the Hill Ore Lease appeared particularly alarmed at the substantial minimum mining
requirements and annual escalation in the royalty, suggesting that the only plausible justification
for such overcompensation would be an anticompetitive intent to foreclose the ore properties from
29competitors. lls This mechanism, however, has a benign justification of providing optimal incentives
to both parties. For example, US Steel’s “take or pay” commitment to mine an annual minimum
tonnage of ore ensured US Steel would fulfill its obligations to develop the land.llg
Consider how the “take or pay” obligation affected US Steel’s incentives in the execution of the
lease, and how that in turn affected the Great Northern’s incentives. Ex-post, US Steel’s marginal
acquisition cost of ore up to the “take” quantity is zero, since the royalty payment is sunk at
that point ,120 so us Steel h~ an incentive to undertake investments to develop the ore land and
actually take delivery of ore that it has already paid for. The Great Northern Railway, on the other
hand, knows that it can undertake specific investments to accommodate this anticipated ore trtic,
since even if this ore traffic does not materialize, US Steel is still obligated to pay for at least some
of the specific costs the Railway has incurred.
US Steel would have the incentive to prepare for substantial mining over the course of years,
abandoning their sunk investment only if their resources could be put to better use at another site.121
From prior experience, US Steel recognized annual minimums committed them to make significant
investments in their mines so that it could produce enough tonnage to satisfy its contractual
obligations .122 This prediction was confirmed over the course oft he many take or pay contracts US
Steel had executed. As a result of such contracts, even during periods of industry-wide contraction,
US Steel continued its Mesabi operations. 123 This commitment to exploit the acquired property
is directly contrary to the foreclosure hypothesis, which would predict that US Steel would simply
stockpile unexploited ore reserves.
305.3.2 Royalty Rate
The Bureau of Corporations considered the 85 cent royalty for the Hill ore lands to be “abso-
lutely unprecedented.’’124 Some other numbers serve as a basis for comparison. From 1902-1906,
the average royalty on all Mesabi ore was 26 cents per gross ton, as reported by the Bureau of
Corporations.125 The Bureau also reported other components entering into the cost of ore deliv-
ered at lower lake ports. The average book cost per ton at mine, including the roydt y, was 78 cents
for Mesabi range ores. Rail freight from the mine to Superior, Wisconsin, or some other appro-
priate port averaged 80 cents. Lake freight from Superior to a lower lake port such as Clevelmd
averaged 77 cents. With the addition of taxes and general expenses, the total book cost of Mesabi
126 Strikingly, this was below the book cost of ores from ore at a lower lake port averaged $2.45.
other ranges in the Lake Superior region: $2.62, $2.93 and $3.09 for the Marquette, Menominee,
and Gogebic range ores, respectively. 127 The extraction costs on the Mesabi were lower, ~d this
was only partially offset by the higher transportation costs. Moreover, these total book costs were
below the prices delivered ore commanded. The base price for delivery at lower Lake Erie ports
in 1906 was $4.00 for Mesabi Bessemer and $3,50 for Mesabi non-Bessemer. 128 So although an 85
cent royalty was very large, it could still be paid profitably if the lease enabled the Mesabi to be
exploited on a larger and lower cost scale.
Note that the royalty was specified in terms of a nominal dollar amount per ton, rather than on
a percentage basis. This appears to have been a common feature of contemporary iron ore leases,
129 One may speculate and so this aspect of the Hill lease did not receive considerable attention.
on the reasons for this arrangement. The alternative of specifying a royalty based on a “market
price” at the point of ore production would have been untenable, because that market was very
31thin. Ore from the Lake Superior region, which included the Mesabi range, was “sold chiefly at
the lower Lake ports, hundreds of miles from the place of production.” lW Perhaps US Steel could
have had undue influence on the market price for such ore, since even before the Hill deal it mined
56 percent of the total Lake Superior ore production. 131 Furthermore, there may have been scope
for manipulating a market price by the railroad precisely because transportation was required for
the ore to reach the relevant market.
The royalty rate of 85 cents per gross ton was due to rise by 3.4 cents per year, which represented
a 4 percent annual increase in the royalty rate. Such a provision was probably not designed to
account for expected economy-wide inflation, since prices had recently stabilized after decades of
deflation. The stipulated 4 percent interest on ore in the ground further encouraged US Steel to
frontload its investment and extraction efforts.132
Assuming that US Steel was paying an “above market” rate for the Hill ore, why was the lease
structured to require US Steel to pay a royalty rate above the opportunity cost of the ore? Such
a wedge could generate distortions in behavior ex-post, and therefore lower the total value of the
transaction to both parties. One possibilityy is connected with the take or pay provision. Since the
payments due on the take level were sunk, US Steel’s ex-post marginal acquisition cost went from
zero (up to the take level) to the 85 cent royalty rate, which included a premium for the Great
Northern. Thus if US Steel subsequently decided to mine and deliver ore in excess of the take
level, it would have to compensate the Great Northern ex-post on this margin. This additiond
compensation might reflect a capacity constraint on the Great Northern, even beyond the expansion
of facilities that would be involved in executing other elements of the lease.
Support for this interpretation comes from another lease term, The Great Northern Railway
was required “to furnish adequate equipments and facilities for receiving, transporting, and docking
32all the ores to be mined by the lessee.” This requirement had the following proviso. The lessors, the
Great Northern, would not be required to furnish “tracks or facilities in any year for transporting or
delivering a greater tonnage than the minimum herein fixed for such year, except upon reasonable
notice in writing first given by the lessee to the trustees .“133 The requirement of advance notice
suggests the need to expand transportation capacity even further for ore levels beyond that year’s
take level.
There is no indication of a maximum quantity specified in the lease, although perhaps because
the guaranteed minimums were so substantial, they were thought to be effective maximums, so
that once US Steel put its mining operation fully into place, it was anticipated that there would
be only relatively small year to year fluctuations in deliveries around the take level.
5.3.3 Freight rate
The royalty rate was not the
transported exclusively on the
only consideration
Great Northern at
the Great Northern received. Ore w= to be
the rate of 80 cents per ton. The freight of 80
cents was the current market rat e for Mesabi transport, but the estimated cost of transporting such
ore was approximately 30 cents per ton, with costs expected to decline further over the duration
of the lease.134 This seemingly excessive freight charge promised the Great Northern may have a
procompetitive justification serving as a “performance bond.” One available mechanism to prevent
opportunistic behavior is to offer the potential opportunist a future premium, a price sufficiently
over spot market to assure income that would exceed the benefits of opportunistic renegotiation.135
k the present case, the freight charges can be understood as a variable premium which tied the
interests of the contracting parties together throughout the life of the contract.
In fact, the need for a performance bond was magnified by another contractual term, The take
33or pay provision might have encouraged opportunism by the Great Northern. Why should the
railroad incur the costs of expanding its facilities? After all, although such a decision would reduce
the tonnage mined, US Steel was still obligated to pay for the annual minimum. Significantly, the
take or pay provision applied only to the royalty rate on ore, not to the freight rate.lw Furthermore,
the lease provided that if the Great Northern did not furnish the necessary tracks, equipment, and
facilities, then after reasonable notice, the Great Northern would be placed in default on the lease,
and US Steel would be allowed to make other transportation arrangements for the period of the
default. So the freight rate may have played an important role in assuring Great Northern’s
performance.
These provisions also illustrate the mutually reinforcing features of the lease, carefully aligning
and balancing both sets of interests to facilitate optimal ex-post execution by both parties.
Of course, if the stipulated freight rate was above the marginal cost of transportation, it could
lower the value of the transaction by inducing distorted choices e-post. For example, one might
wonder about US Steel’s decision to build a steel plant in Duluth, Minnesota. Since Duluth is
on Lake Superior, the plant was designed to receive ore afler it had been transported by the
Great Northern from the Mesabi range. Since alternative steel production was located in Gary or
Pittsburgh, the Duluth plant was sited to save on the cost of transporting ore to these alternate
locations. The Duluth plant was planned to produce steel for markets west and north of the Great
Lakes.137 Because the transportation cost savings that motivated the Duluth plant largely involved
Lake freight and railroads other than the Great Northern, it is unlikely that the lease’s 80 cent
freight rate played a significant role in this investment decision.
345.3.4 Sliding Scale Royalty
One lease term which has been largely overlooked is the sliding scale of royalty prices for the
mining of ore of lower grade. This pricing structure encouraged US Steel to internalize the gains on
exploitation of an additional synergy resulting from combining the Great Northern Properties with
US Steel’s preexisting Mesabi holdings. Although the Mesabi ore was known to be of generally high
quality, a substantial portion of the range was of lesser grade. During the years leading up to and
immediately following the Hill Ore Lease, US Steel worked on perfecting devices for concentrating
the immense quantity of sandy ores on the Western Mesabi Range .138
Following two years of intensive experimentation, US Steel made a significant site specific invest-
ment in 1908 as it erected a permanent washery and concentrating plant on the Western Mesabi, at
Coleraine, Minnesota, at a total cost of $1.4 million.139 US Steel anticipated that the concentrating
plant would process ore with an iron content as low as 36 percent, producing concentrated ore with
iron content in the neighborhood of 57 percent. 140 By 1911, the plant was operating near its full
capacity.141 The sliding scale feature of the lease made the lean ores a relative bargain for US
Stee1142 which could therefore internalize the gains resulting from its investments in concentrating
technology, plants, and equipment. US Steel ultimately failed to realize the maximum benefit from
the sliding scale, however, because it terminated the lease prior to the time when it could extract
a substantial tonnage of low grade ore from the Great Northern Properties.143
5.3.5 Unilateral Option to Terminate
These apparent efficiency benefits from the lease raise the question of why, if the lease were so clearly
beneficial, did US Steel insist upon receiving an option to cancel the lease in 1915. One possible
explanation is that the uncertainty involved in the ore acquisition in 1906 was so substantial that
35prudence dictated reevaluation of the economics of the transaction prior to committing to meet the
annual minimum of 8.25 million tons for the duration of the lease. In addition to this business factor,
there is an additional potential efficiency concern. The principal difficulty posed by uncertainty in
the presence of relationship-specific investment is that contractual gaps tend to be larger and the
occasions for sequential adaptations (and thus for opportunistic behavior) increase concurrently
with the increase in uncertainty.
Uncertainty clearly was a significant factor in US Steel’s evaluation of the Hill Ore Lease in
1906. The parties had to make rough estimates of the magnitude and quality of the ore holdings,
estimates that varied dramatically. 144 In addition, the value of the lease over time would depend
on the relative scarcity of available iron ore both domestically and internationally.145 Finally,
future demand by US Steel and the steel industry as a whole could not be precisely predicted.
The unilateral option to terminate the relationship is an easily enforceable feature which could
foster efficient adaptation as these uncertainties were resolved over time.146 It is difficult to assess
the efficacy of the lease cancellation option w an enforcement mechanism, however, both because
the mechanism would likely be exercised privately and because the threat of the government’s
dissolution suit prompted US Steel to cancel the lease prematurely before it could serve its intended
business purpose.
The lease did not give the Great Northern Railway a similar option to terminate its obligations.
The benefits from such an option would have been relatively low, since as indicated most of the
uncertainty about the value of the lease was on the side of US Steel. Moreover, the costs of adding
such an option could have been substantial. If both parties to an exchange have the option to
terminate the arrangement, then such an option can be used as a threat to renegotiate terms
opportunistically ex-post. Ex-post bargaining, and its attendant threat to relationship-specific
36investments, would have been encouraged. Of course, US Steel might have used its sole possession
of this option to extract rents from the Great Northern ex-post, but the Great Northern’s position
was protected by other lease terms, in particular the take or pay requirement.
Because US Steel did exercise its option to terminate, we can examine the implementation of
that option. In particular, was there a “settling up” of specific investments by the parties before
control was surrendered? We have been unable to find what lewe terms governed the settling up
of specific investments. We know a little bit more about how settling up occurred.
US Steel permitted the Trustees to begin preparing mines which US Steel did not plan to work
prior to 1915. In return for permission to begin developing the properties, the certificate holders
agreed to assume payment of taxes on such properties, which were turned over on March 1, 1912.147
At the termination of the lease on December 31, 1914, the Trustees for the Great Northern
Ore properties took possession of all eight mines that had been developed by US Steel. Five of
those mines had been nearly exhaust ed, but three cent ained considerable unexploited tonnage. In
1914 “the railway tracks, head frames, boiler and engine houses, and considerable other equipment
of [these] mines, were purchased, in place” from the Steel Corporation by the Trustees.14s The
purchase price for these assets was not disclosed in the annual reports of either the Trustees or the
Steel Corporation. 149 There is no indication that US Steel made any additional payments to the
Great Northern Railway to cover the Railway’s investments. This is unsurprising, since the high
take or pay requirements served in part as payment for those investments. Moreover, since the
lease termination resulted in the ore lands reverting to the Great Northern’s control, the Railroad
ww better positioned than US Steel to recoup its investments after the lease period.
375.3.6 Lease vs. Sale
We examine one other lease “term,” namely the lease structure itself. The parties decided to
structure the transaction as a lease rather than as a sale of the Great Northern Properties. This is
striking, since much of the transaction cost literature emph~izes the potential for opportunism in
the execution of long term cent racts. The choice of a lease structure may have been a concession
to the economic reality that the Great Northern ww not the fee owner of all the properties.150
Yet there are suggestions that a lease arrangement might have been preferred to an ownership
relationship. As modelled by Grossman and Hart (1986), ownership is the acquisition of residud
rights of control. The acquisition of these rights by one party deprives those rights from the second
party, and this can adversely affect the second party’s incentives to undertake investments. The
lease structure was chosen to establish the comparative duties of the parties, both of whom were
important to the success of the venture. As we have noted, both US Steel and the Great Northern
had to make investments in executing the lease. Thus, even if sale in fee of the Great Northern
Properties had been possible, the need to preserve incentives ex post for kth parties may have
made a long-term contracting structure preferable.151
The problems with an outright ownership arrangement can be illustrated by considering what
would have happened had US Steel purchased the Great Northern Ore lands directly. It then
would have needed to contract with the Great Northern railroad (or some other railway) for freight
services. Although railroad freight rates were regulated in this period, there is potential for ex-post
opportunism by both parties. If US Steel attempted to negotiate a freight agreement after it had
sunk investments on the land, part of the value of this investment could be expropriated ex-post by
the Great Nort hem. On the other hand, once the Great Northern sunk the required expansion of
38track and loading docks to handle the expanded ore traffic, those site specific assets were not going
to be moved. Hence, US Steel could then attempt to renegotiate more favorable freight terms. The
problems of bilateral monopoly emphasized in the transaction cost literature loom large,
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to inquire whether the problem is created by the governance struc-
ture (ownership versus lease), or whether it is created by the sequential rather than simultaneous
timing of agreements. One might imagine that a sde agreement could include a clause indicating
that ore would be carried on the Great Northern Railway at pre-specified terms. Such a clause, if
enforceable ex-post, could constrain both parties’ ex-post bargaining flexibility and hence reduce
opportunistic behavior. Clearly, some of the lease terms could have been replicated, for example
agreeing to high freight charges to serve as a performance bond for the Great Northern. But other
features seem unique to the lease arrangement. For example, US Steel’s unilateral option to termi-
nate gave it both flexibility to adapt to changed external circumstances and a threat to use against
non-performance by the Great Northern.
5.4 Are lease terms consistent with vertical foreclosure?
Although the foregoing has outlined the efficiency rationale for these various lease terms, it is
worthwhile to step back and consider which terms were or were not compatible with the alternate
hypothesis of vertical foreclosure. In particular, if bringing the Great Northern ore lands under the
control of US Steel would generate vertical foreclosure, then that would create private value for the
contracting parties. That private value would be from the monopoly profits created or defended
by this lease, and so one might expect that the lease would share these monopoly rents with the
Great Northern Railway.
Although not couched precisely in that language, that is clearly the intuition underlying the
39Bureau of Corporation’s condemnation of the high royalty and freight rates the Great Northern
interests were to receive in the lease. The Great Northern’s profitable arrangement was taken as
evidence of anticompetitive effect. The presence of profits or a premium for the Great Northern
is consistent with vertical foreclosure; the precise form of this arrangement is more difficult to
reconcile with the foreclosure hypothesis. In particular, why was the Great Northern compensated
based on royalties and freight rates, in other words, based upon the quantity of ore extracted from
the property? As an alternative arrangement, US Steel could have bought the Great Northern
lands outright, or at least all those lands held in fee by the Great Northern. If a lease arrangement
w= necessary, US Steel could have contracted to lease the land for a fixed charge per year, or an
increasing charge over time.
The one advantage of the royalty arrangement was in sharing risk between the parties concerning
the total amount of ore in the Great Northern lands. Because this was unknown to both parties, a
royalty rate would provide better insurance than a fixed annual charge. For example, if the ore on
the Hill properties turned out to be unexpectedly low, US Steel’s royalty and freight payments would
fall. But from a foreclosure perspective, this was very expensive insurance, since under foreclosure
the value of the transaction comes from keeping the ore out of production. So the actual lease, by
generating incentives for the properties to be exploited ez-post, directly undermined any foreclosure
motivation.
This is related to another point that has been raised earlier. The take or pay provision, by
inducing US Steel to exploit the properties ex-post, is directly contrary to the foreclosure hypothesis,
which would have left these ores unexploited. Of course, hypothetically US Steel could have reduced
its exploitation of its other ore lands to more than offset its exploitation of the Great Northern
properties. But the historical record suggests otherwise. First, because US Steel had sizeable
40annual minimums on its other ore leases, it was committed to exploit those properties as well.
Second, US Steel’s total iron ore production rose in the aftermath of the Hill lease, increasing from
18,486,556 tons in 1905 to 25,245,816 tons in 1910.152
US Steel’s unilateral option to terminate the lease is problematic for some models of vertical
foreclosure but not for others, In the early work on foreclosure, up through models by Krattenmaker
and Salop (1986) and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), successful foreclosure requires that the
integrated firm commit not to supply its unintegrated rivals with the input, or alternatively, that
the integrated firm commit not to supply its unintegrated rivals except at a very high price. An
option to terminate the vertical relationship is the opposite of a commitment, since it preserves
some flexibilityy. This is not a problem for the Hart and Tirole (1990) model, since they derive
foreclosure effects from profit sharing within the integrated firm rather than from commitment.
Nevertheless, the cancellation option, when coupled wit h the other terms of the lease, poses a
problem under any of these theories of foreclosure. Because the other lease terms committed US
Steel to develop the properties, if they surrendered these properties they would leave rivals with
enhanced access to iron ore. That possibility was recognized by Iron Age in 1907,153 and subsequent
experience bore out that concern. Strikingly, the leases made by the Trustees immediately following
US Steel’s cancellation of the Hill Ore Lease involved those mines which had been previously
developed either by US Steel or the Trustees. 154 Admittedly US Steel cancelled the lease under >
antitrust pressure. But whatever the motive, cancellation after investments were sunk would bring
about an outcome opposite of foreclosure.6 Conclusion
The quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in this paper supports the hypothesis that the
Hill Ore Lease was an efficient governance structure designed to overcome the problem of ex post
opportunism that typically arises in contracts involving significant relationship-specific investment.
Conversely, the evidence seriously undermines the conventional foreclosure explanation of US Steel’s
acquisition of the Great Northern Properties, a view which has enjoyed widespread acceptance.
Beyond the historical significance of these findings, the data has shown that US Steel, a firm
with greater than 50 percent of the market share in both the iron ore and steel markets, acquired
the final significant independent source of iron ore, and yet generated a positive efficiency sufficient
to generate an implied lowering of steel prices. This astonishing result forces serious reconsideration
of the advisability of the recent attention directed at vertical relationships among firms with much
lower levels of market share and industry concentration.
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68Table 1: Average Estimated Event Responses
(t statistics in parentheses)
EVENT US STEEL GN RAILWAY STEEL RIVALS RAILROADS
LEASESIGN .04130 -.01420 -.01194 .00959
(1,9865) (-0.6272) (-0.7674) (1.8372)
Tables
69Table 2: Sample of Steel Companies
United States Steel
Americm Steel Foundries
Colorado Fuel and Iron
National Enameling and Stamping
Republic Iron and Steel
Sloss Sheffield
Tennessee Cod and Iron
U.S. Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry
70Table 3: Sample of Steam Railroads
!tchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe
!tlantic Coast Line
3altimore and Ohio
;entral of New Jersey
Chesapeake and Ohio
;hicago Great Western
Ohicago, Milwaukee, and St.Paul
Uhicago and Northwestern
31eveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis
Colorado Southern
Delaware and Hudson
Denver and Rio Grande
Erie
Erie First Preferred





Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie
Missouri, Kansas and Texas
Missouri Pacific
New York Central
New York, Chicago and St. Louis
New York, New Haven and Hartford













Wheeling and Lake Erie
Wisconsin Central




American Car & Foundry
American Locomotive


















Freight & Passenger Cars
Locomotives
Bar Gold & Silver, pig lead















Primary outputs were found in Malcolm R. Burns, “An Empirical Analysis of Stock-
holder Injury Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,” Journal of Industrial Economicg.
31 (June 1983), p. 349, as supplemented by Moody’s Analyses of Public Utilities and
Industrials, 1918.
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